An Interview with President Roh Moo-hyun by Sohn Seok-hee of MBC TV's 100-Minute Discussion
Place: Front garden of Sangchunjae (Spring House) at Cheong Wa Dae
MODERATOR: Mr. President, it has been reported that you asked at the Korea-U.S. summit for the postponement of additional sanctions against North Korea. It was also reported that you asked to wrap up the investigation into Banco Delta Asia as early as possible when you met U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Cheong Wa Dae stated that this was not true. Would you please explain exactly what took place at the time?
PRESIDENT: At the official talks, I did not raise the issue because it was not an appropriate subject and I felt it would be better not to do so. When Secretary Paulson expressed his wish to meet with me, I thought it was desirable to meet him. When we met, he did not seem to have specific things to say. He appeared to want to hear about the Korean economy as he had much interest in economic subjects in general.
As a matter of fact, the United States launched its investigation into Banco Delta Asia several days prior to the signing of the September 19 Joint Statement last year. It just was not announced publicly. Accordingly, it is rather complicated to define the U.S. investigation as a sanction against North Korea and I am not in a position to take issue with this matter. Nonetheless, I do hope that the investigation would be completed at an early date because the Six Party Talks are stalled over the issue.
So, I asked him, "Why is it taking this long and when is it expected to be completed?" As you know, investigations often proceed speedily in Korea and that is why I asked it took so long. Secretary Paulson answered that there are many other investigations that take more time than the one into Banco Delta Asia. He went on to say that it is a standard practice and that no particular ill intention should be presumed. So, I jokingly replied, "If you leave the matter to the Korean prosecutors, they would finish the investigation promptly (audience laughter) but it seems to require a long while in the U.S." That's about all the casual conversation I had with Secretary Paulson on this issue.
Secretary Paulson explained that an investigation of this nature requires extensive time and personnel. Wouldn't it be difficult to conclude that a remark at this level constitutes a kind of a request? Again, it was not something that I requested and Secretary Paulson explained the situation as he saw it. Besides, this issue was not the subject matter of this summit.
MODERATOR: I understand but this issue seems to have spiraled into a controversy owing to a comment by the Korean Ambassador to the U.S. Then, should we understand that Ambassador Lee misunderstood the pertinent part of the discussion?
PRESIDENT: Well, sort of… Given that I had made such statement, the Ambassador may have felt that I was expressing a hope that the investigation be completed as early as possible.
MODERATOR: As you may be well aware…
PRESIDENT: Couldn't it be described as "it was requested?"
MODERATOR: Yes. I asked this question because many people were of an opinion that there is a problem if Ambassador Lee misunderstood the relevant part of the discussion.
PRESIDENT: My view is that there is no particular reason why this should be subject to such controversy. This has been amplified unnecessarily and I do not think it is that important a matter.
MODERATOR: We have heard President Roh's explanation of the situation at the time in his own words. I understand your explanation.
You mentioned that it is not an important matter. In fact, what matters more is the "common and comprehensive approach," which has been subject to controversy until now. I interviewed Chief Secretary for Unification, Foreign and Security Policy Song Min-soon on this issue as well. It may be the case that a complete agreement has not been reached yet. I wonder, however, if the Korean Government has put together a proposal to a certain degree.
PRESIDENT: Although I cannot explain the substance of our proposal, let me describe briefly how it has been proceeding.
The September 19 Joint Statement may be downplayed as just one of a dozen agreements because it has been stalled and has not been implemented so far. If you take a close look at it in the historic context, however, you may find that the statement has a tremendously significant message. Simply put, it was a crucial joint statement that relates not only to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem but also to a starting point in creating a new order in Northeast Asia leading to a multilateral security consultative body or regime in the region. It is, however, quite frustrating that the initiative has not been able to move forward.
As I mentioned before, the U.S. has already initiated something similar to a sort of financial sanction against the North. The other nations were thinking, "Isn't the U.S. already imposing sanction?" and South Korea looked at it with a similar view. According to the explanation offered by the U.S., however, this was not the case and this issue had already been in place before all this took place. Things have been stalled over this problem and Korea and the U.S. have appeared as if they were going separate ways. This situation has continued for quite a while, which I consider very undesirable.
Consequently, the presidential office for national security and the foreign ministry worked together to break this situation, the current deadlock, and came out with various proposals including my visit to the U.S. My working visit schedule was the result of those efforts. We aimed initially at creating a harmonious coordination between Korea and the U.S. during my visit. Now the working level talks have begun and the two countries are discussing diverse initiatives.
MODERATOR: You mentioned earlier that you could not explain those initiatives in detail…
PRESIDENT: Meanwhile, this summit aimed at making such efforts official at the highest level of the heads of state, and the agreement at the summit to come up with a common and comprehensive approach was the outcome of such formalizing process. Despite its brevity, I believe that this phrase has an enormous meaning.
MODERATOR: I apologize that I keep referring to Chief Secretary Song Min-soon. I understand he is present in the audience. At an interview, Mr. Song stated, "While it is difficult, this is something only Korea can do." I understand that you cannot disclose everything but could you please give us an example of what only Korea can do?
PRESIDENT: This is exactly the case. Right now, North Korea and the U.S. face each other tensely with conflicting views. It will be difficult to resolve the problem if South Korea would collaborate only with the U.S. and push the North into corners. On the other hand, suppose South Korea worked solely with the North on the principle of inter-Korea collaboration to pressure the U.S., the U.S. would not back away readily. It is quite a tense situation. Here South Korea should stay the center and, through the constant discussion and consultation with China, we need to come up with a proposal that is acceptable both to the U.S. and North Korea. With regard to persuading the two parties to incorporate their stances into the proposal, China would be largely tasked to persuade the North and South Korea would need to persuade the U.S. And persuasion alone may not be all. Persuasion is only possible when there is trust, that the intermediator is trustworthy. Therefore, South Korea needs to work on trust-building all around, among other things.
MODERATOR: As for things only Korea can do… In fact, the September 19 Join Statement is to some extent equivalent to a comprehensive approach. Isn't it so? In this light - notwithstanding many controversies surrounding the statement at the time - can we interpret 'what only Korea can do' meaning that Korea should shoulder an enormous burden, a substantial portion of economic costs?
PRESIDENT: Please do not look at the matter solely in terms of a burden. South Korea is taking the considerable initiative although we do not have decisive authority or power. While we may not be able to make a decisive conclusion, our role to narrow differences between the parties is highly important. South Korea is the most proactive party. With regard to the September 19 Joint Statement on which South Korea and China were known to collaborate, South Korea took a bit more active role in bringing about such a proposal.
If necessary, we may have to bear a burden. However, South Korea would not repeat the past experience of having a financial burden forced on us in 1994. At the time, we failed to stay focused and just continued to make irrelevant remarks to the U.S. and the North that they should not engage in dialogue when such dialogue was already underway. This time, we will bear any burden that we should. For costs for peace - costs for reunification in future - will be ultimately become our responsibility and we can reduce them if we prepare ourselves and take necessary measures now rather than later. Otherwise, we may end up spending more resources and still becoming unable to take care of the situation adequately and, therefore, we should shoulder the responsibility accordingly. Thus, I believe that we need not look down upon ourselves with cynicism that Koreans remain as onlookers and are called to bear a burden.
MODERATOR: Please clarify this one point for us. Concerning the economic burden on the Korean Government under the September 19 Statement - I understand that you referred to it as "costs" instead of a "burden" - is it possible for South Korea to pay more costs under this comprehensive approach if it becomes materialized?
PRESIDENT: The present comprehensive approach is rather about a procedural approach. When the parties are again at the table of the Six-Party Talks, they will restart from the September 19 Statement as far as content is concerned. Therefore, the comprehensive approach of this time has little of the substantive matter.
MODERATOR: As a matter of fact, how North Korea would perceive this approach may be another crucial point of concern. I do not know if you could verify this but I presume that you did not come up with this common and comprehensive approach on the spot once you were in the U.S. You mentioned that this has been in preparation from early on and, if this is the case, it may be somewhat solidified. Have you delivered to North Korea and, if so, have you heard of any responses?
PRESIDENT: North Korea cannot be said to have rendered a response. However, the North is aware of it and has not expressed proactively a negative opinion until now.
MODERATOR: Could you please tell us when this was proposed to the North?
PRESIDENT: At this point, I cannot recollect exactly when it was.
MODERATOR: Was it before you visited the U.S. then?
PRESIDENT: Yes, it was. It has been quite a while as Mr. Song had been proceeding with this proposal since when my visit to the U.S. had been finalized.
MODERATOR: You mentioned that North Korea has not rendered a response yet. Does that mean that there was no response at all?
PRESIDENT: I can say, "No negative opinion has been expressed proactively." We continue to proceed with this proposal without giving it up. Can we continue to work on something that is hopeless? So, we still see a possibility in this and we continue to proceed because it is not necessarily negative that no response has been rendered.
MODERATOR: The problem is that there has been a stream of talks that the U.S. is negative about it. Looking at recent media reports - as you are aware - the Grand National Party (GNP) officials recently visited the U.S. to address this issue. They commented afterward that both the U.S. Government and Congress continue to adopt a hard-line stance when it comes to sanctions against North Korea. The party officials also added that the U.S. is very skeptical about the "common and comprehensive approach" that Korea suggested.
PRESIDENT: You are likely to get different views of the U.S. depending on which people you talk to. What is most important, however, is that President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice among others are at the core of the policymaking process. In addition, many other people voice many different opinions. During my recent visit to the U.S., I also met many people, whose opinions varied.
As the GNP officials have their own political perspective, wouldn't they be pleased to hear that things would not work during their visit to the U.S.? It has been like that until now. I wish that they would not have gone that far. Whatever difference we have, our debate has to be settled on our own turf as the president is going around to do his diplomatic outreach efforts. Parliamentary diplomacy has to be conducted in a way that facilitates the nation's diplomatic endeavors. Throwing a monkey wrench into the Government's foreign affairs certainly is not within the realm of parliamentary diplomacy as far as I am concerned. It is welcome for them to join the bandwagon if it would benefit the nation. If things are not going well, at least they should leave them to the president's authority for foreign affairs. The Constitution vests in the president the authority to carry out foreign affairs and the people of Korea directly vote the president into the office. I don't think it is desirable for them, in the vernacular expression, to go in an opposite direction and upset the applecart by caviling about the Government's foreign policy.
MODERATOR: Perhaps the GNP has a rationale of its own. In any case, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's name has been floated in the news a lot lately. After all, this is all related to the North Korean nuclear issue. Mr. Armitage said that North Korea would go firmly ahead with nuclear testing. Do you believe that this is feasible?
PRESIDENT: I believe that it is inappropriate for someone assuming stewardship over national affairs to predict anything of that nature with certainty. Rather, it is more sensible to prepare for all possible scenarios. For instance, if there is a one percent chance, it is acceptable for others to say that there is no possibility. In case of a president who holds a responsibility for something of one percent chance, he or she has to say that there is a possibility and make preparations accordingly. What we are doing now is making various diplomatic efforts so that something of such a nature would never take place.
MODERATOR: Please let me rephrase my question because I would like to see this to lead to the issue of OPCON transfer. Mr. Armitage stated that the ongoing negotiations over the OPCON transfer should be re-examined if North Korea goes ahead with nuclear testing. Of course, this is a hypothetical situation but do you agree with him?
PRESIDENT: There is no direct link between OPCON transfer and North Korea's nuclear testing or no testing. The likelihood of war and OPCON transfer are two separate issues. Wartime operational control is something that the nation is entitled to and is capable of exercising. It bears no direct relevance to this line of discussion.
MODERATOR: I would like to ask one more question in this regard. It appears that there are some speculations in the U.S. that it may resort to military action if North Korea pushes through with nuclear testing. Are you familiar with this?
PRESIDENT: The speculation persisted for quite some time in the U.S. and not just in the U.S. A preemptive strike theory has even appeared in Japan as well. This is one of many controversies and I believe it is undesirable for the highest-ranking official of the Republic of Korea in charge of national security to pick just one controversy and express a hypothetical opinion about it.
Nonetheless, all of us should give a considerable degree of thought to the wave of consequences on the Korean Peninsula beyond North Korea in case anyone contemplates taking military action against the North before the North takes military action first. We should give a serious thought to the predicament that it would force the Korean Peninsula into. At least the people of South Korea should think and speak with considerable caution.
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2008년 8월 6일 17:22
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