President Roh spoke at the 50th meeting of the Standing Committee of National Unification Advisory Council
Thanks for the comments from the three committee members. Their remarks pricked my conscience somewhat.
Their comments on the principles of trust, consistency and a public consensus are understandably construed as their apprehension about the current situation. I myself have put a top priority on these principles and yet the public now consider that the Government has no principles at all.
Long before I became President, I always invoked one word on every occasion I spoke - that word is "trust." I regard trust as a prime social value, but the credibility of Government policies has continued to be questioned. I am ashamed of that fact. Consistency and reliability are not that different, either. The primary goal of the Participatory Government is now being criticized and shaken like this. I mean the goal that I have respected the most and tried to realize at all cost. I will see what more I can do about it. I will never give in, but there is no way to prove that my goal is being met.
The Participatory Government bases its policies on pragmatism because reciprocity may turn out to be a perfunctory and rigid principle. The two Koreas have different conditions, circumstances and views in conducting inter-Korea relations. As someone once remarked, one may simply say that inter-Korea relations should be placed on a reciprocal basis, just like the principle of an eye-for-an-eye. Inter-Korean relations, however, are not that simple. Ultimately, we must make a case-by-case judgment on whether South-North exchanges can go along with our pursuit of the goal of peace and trust. South Korea is not unilaterally pumping money into the North. The Government is seeking more advantageous ways to secure trust from a long-term perspective until two Koreas will achieve a bigger goal through dialogue. You may want to understand the policy concept of pragmatism as opposed to that of reciprocity.
I did not veto legislation to investigate past cases of suspicious money transfers to the North. The public called for transparency in inter-Korea dialogue and exchanges, which I accepted. The idea of an executive action above the law to facilitate inter-Korea relations, if such an action might be justifiable at all, may take place only if the public approves it.
There also have been several incidents of late. I have instructed the Government to follow a consistent principle and discontinue contact with the North when it disrupted dialogue and to reject its demands when it sent a unilateral notice. Currently, various forms of aid to the North have been suspended. This is a strategic option and the basic principle is what serves our own interest in a strategic sense.
In addition, the Government will make every effort to follow the principles of simultaneous action and of the separation of public and private sectors. Regarding the recommendation that the Republic should continue to persuade the U.S. Government and Congress, please note that the Government has been working in this direction to achieve the goal of "no nuclear weapons and common prosperity." If there is any good idea for an alternative appellation, I will review the matter again.
As for the recommendation that reaching an agreement on dismantling the Cold War structure and establishing a peace regime should go along with the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement includes it all. The joint statement also has provisions on negotiations for a peace regime and even a multilateral security system for Northeast Asia. The joint statement may appear to some to be of no avail because it is drifting at the moment, but it still contains novel concepts.
The September 19 Joint Statement came as South Korea was playing a key role in efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Then the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue surfaced, which is difficult for me to comprehend. As the Joint Statement was being signed in China, the U.S. Department of the Treasury had already taken actions to freeze the BDA accounts two to three days before. Looking back, it may be said that the State Department was not aware in Beijing that financial sanctions had already been imposed a day or two ago. And things have this far while the State Department has been unable to resolve it. If one wants to look at it in a bad light, one may say that it was all coordinated (between the two departments). I may guess that the Treasury and State Departments differed largely on interpreting the principle. The State Department may have been in support of some political flexibility while the Treasury Department supported going by the law. Still, we cannot know clearly.
Although the September 19 Joint Statement was buried the moment it was born, it will sprout again when spring comes and will be able to serve as a stepping-stone toward the dismantlement of the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and even a multilateral security or peace system in Northeast Asia. And we will move forward in this direction.
Why should the two Koreas be reunited? The foremost reason is that we need to ensure peace, through which we will be able to lay a foundation for more prosperity. Besides, if a more decent human life is that those who share the same blood, language and culture should get together and live as one, we should pursue reunification to lead such a life.
The aim of national security is peace. It is about preventing war, rather than winning it. To this end, we should pursue national security based on dialogue. There are occasions where confrontational atmosphere is consistently forged for the sake of national security. In these cases, hostility and distrust would be settled as one side continues to suspect the other.
If national security is to preclude war, it can be said to be sufficient if one can completely defeat and overpower enemy attacks while incurring no harm or just slight scratches or bruises. Then, let us imagine a situation where our enemies cannot conquer nor rule us even if they launch attacks. Will they have any rewarding advantage in waging a war when they cannot occupy nor conquer their foes after defeating them? No one with common sense will ever dare to start a war against a country that cannot be occupied or ruled. Having said this, isn't it enough to have just sufficient force not to be defeated? If one understands that he is likely to sustain more damage than is inflicted on an opponent, he will not, if not insane, dare to strike first. Such an insane act would not be possible unless he is oblivious to his goal or comparative strength.
Then, we have to judge whether our counterpart is normal, totally insane, or just completely stupid. The premise always has been that it is an immoral and abnormal being whose next step cannot be predicted. As a presidential candidate, I was asked if I considered Kim Jong-il to be a reasonable man. If my answer had been "yes," then I would have suffered unrecoverable damage. "No" would have not been any better. This kind of question is vivid testimony to where Korean politics stood. Within the framework of communism, or juche ideology in the North, Mr. Kim may be seen to have a judgment. Simply put, will he commit any act to harm himself? If one is completely cornered, he or she may do something unexpected. As there is no consensus among South Koreans whether he is normal or not, the moment I make a comment that Kim Jong-il may be in his right mind, I should prepare for the end of my career.
Even if we have a possible victory after hostilities despite all our efforts to prevent a war, damage would be significant. This is why we should find a way to deter war. However, we are unable to arrive at consensus on whether we are dealing with a man with a normal state of mind or one who is demented. Because anyone with a normal state of mind would make an assessment that any provocation by the North against the South would be nothing short of suicidal, I think national security would be in good shape as long as it is managed in an appropriate manner. When I nominate ministers, those who often question the ideological views of their fellow citizens ask the nominees at the National Assembly hearings whether the Korean War was started by the North or the South. I chafe at their argument grounded, I guess, in an assumption that I am not intelligent enough and would appoint a cabinet member who does not even know how the Korean War started. I can tell you that I have that much intelligence.
Everything must be resolved through dialogue instead of resorting to war and a show of power, and a precondition for dialogue is to acknowledge the existence of the other party and even to respect it. One must acknowledge the possibility that the other party may be right and one can be wrong. In a word, it is tolerance. National security can be strengthened through dialogue, that is, untangling inter-Korea relations through dialogue and initiating talks before resorting to war or force.
In addition, national security can be pursed calmly. North Korea launches missiles in a certain direction toward waters off Hamgyongbuk-do (province) and it became clear that they were not directed at South Korea. Changes in political and security environments take place slowly and collectively over a period of time, and missile launches of one time do not mean that a war would break out the same day. Having said that, should the Government roll up its sleeve to issue an emergency alert in the wee hours of the morning, announcing, "Fellow citizens, missiles were just launched. Stockpile instant noodle and check on your gas masks?" As I was briefed of missile launches, it was suggested that the National Security Council be immediately convened. But I saw no reason to stoke fear among the public and opted instead for a meeting of concerned ministers at 11:00 a.m. There was no difference in our handling this issue, whether it was a cabinet or a National Security Council meeting and whether the meeting was held at 5 in the morning or 11 at night. There was no difference either in the outcome of the event or in the earlier assessment stage. Yet there was so much criticism at me for not orchestrating a drumbeat of fear among the public. Let us conduct national security calmly. Korea has enough strength and military capacity to safeguard adequately its own national security without beating a drum of fear and making a big fuss.
Many who voted for me insisted that I should cut down on defense spending and channel it into public welfare. Nevertheless, I did not reduce defense spending and increased funding for national defense instead. Historically, the objective of Korea's national defense is not just to deter North Korea's aggression. When Korea's military strength was weak and not strong enough to fend off China and Japan's military power, a power vacuum was created on the Korean Peninsula, and the entire nation was turned into a battlefield as seen in the Hideyoshi Invasion, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Russo-Japanese War were fought. Doesn't this tell you that, to prevent such incidents from taking place again, we should secure defense capability to the extent no foreign armies could march into our territory and wage a war on it? Unless the strands of potentially complex and hostile relations piling up among China, Japan and the United States become transformed through a new paradigm, such as a multilateral security system or a regional community in Northeast Asia, Korea must retain defense capacity based on reciprocity. And this is why I cannot afford to reduce defense spending.
Some ask why the Republic's relations with the United States have frayed, and yet I do not believe this is the case. When I was elected as the President, there were numerous reports of potential military strikes against North Korea in Korean and American newspapers. Whether the legitimate authorities did or did not make such comments did not matter. The public is bound to feel uneasy when they read such reports. Accordingly, I said that a military strike against the North should never happen. Those who had led the national security policies and discussions in our society then said that there was a big problem and Roh Moo-hyun would hurt Korea's ties with the United States. Nevertheless, I said that war was simply not an option, and I do not know whether that was the right thing to do.
In the culture in which we live, there is a way to determine whether you are a person of good standing among your peers. When you invite your old friends and they come, you are in good shape. You are even in a better shape if your friend lends you money when you ask. Likewise, if Korea is a solid country, many travelers will flock in and there will be investors and lenders. When I was elected, there were speculations that there would be no more foreign investment and there were stories about lenders charging a higher spread for loans. This is basically equivalent to saying foreign lenders are unwilling to provide credit access to Korea. Once a country is unable to borrow money, it is in a world of trouble. Unless it checks on itself and shores up its credit rating immediately, it may roll right back into a financial crisis similar to one in 1997.
So, here was a new president who had never been to the United States and there were rumors of an imminent war. I was troubled inside and outside. There had to be a way to prevent the North Korean nuclear standoff from spiraling into war and at the same time to ensure Korea-U.S. relations remained strong. The first question that investors and lenders asked was whether war would break out and North Korea would collapse. When I said it would not happen, then they asked whether I would keep good relations with the U.S. and, of course, I said "yes." At the time, some thought Korea-U.S relations would remain solid and others said something catastrophic was going to happen. Perhaps the latter thought, now that this blindly fearless man was elected as the President of Korea, they would intimidate him a little by continuously projecting a gloomy prospect that Korea-U.S. ties would deteriorate.
Accordingly, I had to make clear two things, that is, there would be no war and Korea-U.S. ties would remain solid. What better ways to prove them than the deployment of Korean troops to Iraq? The deployment of Korean troops to Iraq represented a barometer of how well the amicable alliance between Korea and the United States continued to function, and it was not about the relationship between Roh Moo-hyun as an individual and the U.S. Some wanted to send 10,000 or 5,000 troops and others even argued to send combat units while many questioned jus ad bellum of the war. In the end, Korea sent 3,000 non-combat troops. This, I think, was the most cost-effective way to achieve the objective of validating the stability of Korea-U.S. relations and its manifestation in the eyes of the international community.
As the United States broached the idea of redeploying the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division to the rear area, there were some people, even those inside the Administration, who expressed concern over the removal of the "tripwire." There were also those who showed uneasiness with the absence of such a mechanism, that is, the U.S. 2nd Infantry division that triggers U.S. intervention in the event of North Korean aggression. They feared that this would jeopardize national security and presented the possibility that the United States would not come to aid of Korea during contingencies. Some anti-America activists claimed that the rear deployment of the U.S. forces was a preliminary step to strike North Korea, on the ground that the U.S. was pulling back the 2nd Infantry Division from the forward line, a likely target of the North Korea's counterattack should the U.S. initiate a preemptive attack. But it is necessary to redeploy the U.S. troops to the rear area, and there is a principle behind that move.
I think that Korea's defense capability in essence caught up with and surpassed that of North Korea in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Assuming that we did surpass North Korea in military strength in, say, 1985, 20 years have passed since then. Our defense spending is ten times greater than North Korea's, and this trend has continued for not just one or two years but 20 years. If you tell me we are weaker than North Korea in defense capability, you had better explain how we managed to face up to the threat from the North in the 1970s and answer whether all our former defense ministers should be charged with negligence of duty.
When we make honest comparisons of defense capabilities, I think the 2nd Infantry Division may well be relocated to the rear areas. The division had long been there, so I might as well have chosen to leave it there as a tripwire instead of causing new controversy. But I agreed to their relocation because of the need to break the psychological dependence and the state of dependence. National defense is possible only when the people have the will and self-confidence to defend their own country. If the people hang onto the United States or just hide behind it counting on big brother's strength, can they be said to have security consciousness? Using the word tripwire doesn't make sense at all. Why should we use the military of other nations as a tripwire when we talk about our own security? We should be the one who bleeds if that's what it takes. We have to have self-confidence. In the absence of self-confidence, how is the President supposed to respond when the United States says it needs to withdraw its troops for whatever reasons? Would the President be able to agree or disagree to their plan with any degree of confidence?
It is plausible we cannot secure complete equality with the United States diplomatically. It is a superpower. It deserves treatment befitting its power and global influence. We will not flatly refuse an international order initiated by the United States. But doesn't a sovereign and independent state have face to save? Doesn't it have a right to show its guts on and off? When the people panic at the news of the planned relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division, would the President or the foreign minister be able to talk with the United States on an equal footing? At any rate, what happened is that they proposed to cut their troops. And I told them to go ahead if that's what they wanted. They also proposed to talk about it in a closed meeting. But we counter-proposed for an open meeting. Then they proposed to postpone the matter. After one year, there were discussions about it, and an agreement was made to make a small-scale troop reduction.
Some people are worried that the relocation of the U.S. Yongsan Garrison somewhere else in the country would cost the nation 5.5 trillion won (About $5.5 billion). But suppose we have to buy it for any reason, and we know the amount is not nearly enough. Suppose a private entity owns the land now used by the U.S. military, then the cost is likely go way higher because the owner can refuse to take the amount appraised by the buyer and can keep asking more. The plot of land in question is a perfect, golden location for constructing various cultural and commercial facilities that all citizens can enjoy. Right now, we cannot even build a road or a subway there. The land is well worth an investment. Former Presidents Kim Young-sam and Roh Tae-woo made an agreement to relocate the base but they lacked the needed money. The Kim Dae-jung Administration, too, was not able to do it as it faced the IMF bailout plan. Now that the economic crisis is over, we will have to proceed with the plan gradually over a span of 10 years.
Because of the relocation plan, there were noisy clashes in Pyeongtaek, the new site for the U.S. military, and many citizens seemed to be bothered by the noise. But don't we have to do what we have to do regardless? That's because the Korean people are hurt deep in their hearts by the present condition that impairs a symbol of a sovereign nation. Granted the United States is our ally, do they have to operate out of the same base in the heart of the capital where the Qing troops were once stationed? At the end of the 19th century, some people may have questioned the real value of destroying a structure that had been built in honor of visiting Chinese envoys and erecting the Independence Gate in its place. But wasn't it at least significant historically and symbolically? We are now engaged in a historical action as well. It is natural that we have to take care of issues involving the Yongsan base, wartime operational control and other things as a sovereign nation should.
Do they really think that the Republic is not capable of exercising its own operational control? I am talking about the people who were in charge of commanding the armed forces in the past and now say that the nation is not ready for controlling its own military operations. They fuss about and make statements that the nation should not take back OPCON. Isn't that what is meant by breach of public trust? I have no doubt in my mind that the Korean armed forces will do very well with their recovered OPCON. The Korean people have been doing very well with their economy, culture, movie making and manufacturing of telephones, cars, and ships. When I went abroad, I was really convinced that we could do anything and everything. Why should we hold back in exercising our own OPCON?
Now, I would like to point out that the Republic faces the diplomatic reality of having to deal with North Korea and China. We certainly do not want any contingency situation let alone war in our relations with North Korea, but sadly we have to presuppose and prepare for such a situation. China will prepare for all situations as well. When Korea discusses Northeast Asian security matters with China after having regained operation control, wouldn't China be more likely to listen to what we have to say? As things stand now, Korea does not have wartime OPCON, and it would not even be able to decide which targets to hit in time of war; do you think Beijing and Pyongyang would listen to us? There fore, we know this issue has crucial diplomatic significance.
Some of them seem to think that a really serious contingency situation will not happen; therefore the nation does not need to worry about the future. Then why would they think that they need an OPCON strategy in the first place? They surely should know the basic principles and basic workings of diplomacy and security strategies. They are one-time Defense Ministers, and they should know all the issues involving North Korea and the need for intense diplomatic contacts when something very serious happens in Pyongyang. Why have they done practically nothing as far as recovery of the OPCON is concerned? It's just beyond me. They seem to believe that anything but Roh Moo-hyun is to be justified. In other words, they are all out to get me.
The strategic flexibility of the United States inevitably entails diplomatic problems whether we want them or not. What we agreed to with respect to the issue of strategic flexibility is that Korea will have to be very careful not to aggravate China inadvertently while the U.S. troops are stationed here. The two Governments have not agreed on any specifics except that they will follow the consensus of the Korean people on important issues. No one knows how things will pan out in the future, so it is only natural that the two Governments follow the consensus and agreement of the Korean people when something comes up down the road.
President George W. Bush and I discussed and settled this matter clearly. National defense reform is being dealt with according to a certain principle. The relevant law has just been passed in the National Assembly. The reform plan was prepared by the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces and was announced to the people. The National Defense Reform 2020 will not be particularly costly. The troop level will be reduced to 500,000 and a further cut is possible. When we presume that we will be fighting against the North only, we will need a sizable troop level because it will involve substantial battles on land. But we have a need to reduce the troop level and increase our weaponry. That is because we need to consider all-directional national security; with the money saved on personnel expenses, we have to develop a high-capacity arsenal. This is the nature of defense reform. As a result, the nation will be able to reduce the undesirable impact of low birth rates. When the military service of young people is shortened, more and more of them will enter the job market, get married earlier than now and have babies.
Who says that the Korean Armed Forces have deteriorated after Roh Moo-hyun assumed the presidency? No newspaper has ever complained about the results of the appointments of general-level officers. There have been no reports of corruption or kickbacks involving the purchase of the mid-air early warning control system costing 1.4 trillion won (US$1.4 billion). It is unfortunate there have been a number of suicide attempts and shooting incidents, but active measures are being taken to rectify the situation. Time is required to correct military culture drastically. But transparency has increased remarkably in the area of personnel, military supplies and budget operation. Reform measures are being carried out to enrich soldiers' lives in their camps.
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2008년 8월 6일 17:22
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