President Roh Moo-hyun's New Year Address to the Nation
Today, I will present you with a report on the policies and achievements of the Participatory Government over the past four years.
First, let me talk about security policy.
Regarding the security policy of the Participatory Government, I will explain to you several principles of the Administration, instead of elaborating on every single policy in detail. With these principles in mind, you may be able to understand sufficiently all the policies of the Participatory Government.
The crux of the policy toward North Korea is peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The reunification issue will follow afterwards. Peace should not be upset for the sake of unification. The best security is to preclude any possibility of war.
The centerpiece of the peace strategy is the wisdom of coexistence. Trust and tolerance are the most important elements in reconciliation, cooperation and coexistence. Trust will not be established if we continue to antagonize, suspect and find fault with our counterpart. We should avoid provoking their self-esteem and concerns, taking issues with them at every turn and placing our self-respect before theirs. If not, a dialog of reconciliation and collaboration will be impossible. We should embrace our counterpart with self-confidence and a broadminded attitude. Confrontation will get us nowhere.
Of course, we must ensure military readiness. An engagement policy is only possible for the strong who have enough power not to fail even if their enemies dupe them. We have appropriate deterrence to guard against any contingency. We are thoroughly prepared. This is what the engagement policy is all about.
Korea-U.S. relations should gradually evolve into a mutual relationship shifting from the past unilateral dependence.
The principle of my Administration is that the country’s security should be protected with our own hands. It is irrational for us to take issue with the United States over everything without making any concession while heavily depending on the Americans for our security. Deploying foreign troops at the frontline and calling them a “trip-wire” is not an attitude that a self-reliant nation should take. It is not a morally correct attitude for our ally either.
More serious than the reality of Korea’s reliance is its psychological dependence. As the sentiment that the nation cannot defend itself without the help of the United States is prevalent, the mere mention of a USFK pullout plunges the entire country into confusion and political turmoil. This is also why a single word uttered by the USFK Commander is splashed all over the front page the following day. The Government’s decision to redeploy the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division to the rear area, to accept a proposal to wind down the USFK troop level without further objection, and to regain wartime operational control (OPCON) is consistent with the view that we should gradually phase out the nation’s dependence on the U.S. military.
Assuming a leading role in the exercise of OPCON is proper for a self-reliant nation. The OPCON transfer, however, is more significant than merely saving face because it will have a potentially substantial impact on public safety, the future of inter-Korea relations, and the diplomatic dynamics in Northeast Asia. The Republic has regained peacetime operational control, but, on close inspection, it amounts to nothing more than a hollow form without substance.
The Participatory Government’s security policy looks toward the future. The Administration is making an effort to strike a skillful balance between the present and future security of the nation as it scopes out an order of Northeast Asia, including changing relations with China and Japan. This needs to be done without being constrained by the narrow framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance. This effort requires a so-called “balancing diplomacy.” The Participatory Government has a vision for multilateral security, and this vision has been reaffirmed by the September 19 Joint Statement and in Korea-U.S. summits. Although seemingly invisible at this point, these diplomatic endeavors will have profound effects on the destiny of our nation.
The Participatory Government has engaged in pragmatic diplomacy that reflects the reality unfolding in security and economic affairs.
Around the time I was elected President, Korea was confronted with a potential crisis situation with the national economy. With foreign capital having already penetrated deep into the Korean economy, the first order of business that I conducted was a meeting with foreign investors. Without a doubt, they expressed their interest in any potential outbreak of war and collapse of North Korea, but on the top of their list of concerns was the future of Korea-U.S. relations. This was also true when U.S. credit rating agencies visited Seoul. The security situations that arise during peacetime normally impact a nation’s future but do have ramifications on the current condition of the national economy, which makes it a relevant factor at the present moment.
In diplomacy, principles that form the main framework have to be adhered to, but we need flexibility when dealing with specifics. Diplomacy concerns reality. Diplomacy is a bilateral, not a one-sided, activity. When we have to argue, we have to argue, but when we have to give due respect to the other side, we must do that. The pursuit of balanced diplomacy and self-reliant national defense has to proceed in a gradual manner. If we attempt to change existing relationships abruptly, we are liable to hurt the other side and might lose more than we can afford to. In our relations with the United States and other neighboring countries, some people maintain that we have to stick to the ways that always worked in the past, but at a fundamental level, this is not possible. Some people maintain that we have to change everything, but realistically this is not possible, either.
The Government has striven to carry out quiet security diplomacy so as not to cause unnecessary anxiety among the people. To cause unnecessary fear and anxiety under the pretext of national security is a bad habit used during dictatorial times.
The North Korean missile launch might affect the future security environment of the country, but it was not an impending crisis. So the Government responded calmly without issuing an emergency warning. However, the Cheong Wa Dae staff told me that the opposition parties and the press would attack the Government if it did not make a big fuss about it, but I refrained from making a fuss. I wanted to put an end to the practice of causing undue public concern for political reasons. And sure enough, I was clobbered badly by the opposition parties and the press. So, I acted differently when the North conducted a nuclear test. My heart was heavy because I was not sure if I was serving the Korean people well by doing differently than the first time. I still can’t decide how to react when a similar incident takes place in the future. I have always thought a calm response is the best thing in such situations, but I am not sure if I will be able to act according to my belief in the future.
I assure you that I have never tried to use national security for a political purpose.
When Mr. Ban Ki-moon was chosen as the UN Secretary-General, part of me said to boast about what I did for him, but I gave that up. That was because I was rudely awakened to the reality that in this country, there are people who even accuse a former President of having bought a Nobel Prize.
In politics, there probably is no better means of reaping windfalls than instigating distrust and animosity among the people. While politicians might succeed by employing such tactics, the cost for the country is dear, indeed. In the past, some politicians secured their interests by rousing regional sentiments. This kind of behavior should never be allowed in the inter-Korean relations. It is quite irrational to accuse the Government of being “pro-North Korea” or for “pouring money” into the North.
In fact, former Administrations, led by the predecessors of the Grand National Party, pledged to take over wartime operational control of Korean troops from Washington and backed the idea for more than 20 years. Some conservative media also gave heavy support to the move then. But they all took a completely changed attitude and opposed the idea when my Administration put forward the plan. Whether or not they meant to say Korea’s security condition has worsened, this is a very political maneuver. Honestly speaking, I was unable to take pride in my position as President of the Republic of Korea after seeing the change in the public attitude, led by the opposition parties and the media, over the issue of returning wartime operational control.
Unless the Six-Party Talks have some success, I do not think that we can hold an inter-Korean summit easily. This is what I have been consistently saying. But we always leave the door open.
As proved in the 2000 general election, an inter-Korean summit does not favor any particular political party. It is not right for political parties to argue that the government should not beg for a summit even though no negotiation or substantial progress has been made. This is no more than a typical time-consuming political tactic designed to pursue party interests.
Besides, I don’t think it is right for prospective presidential candidates, who are not even sure whether they will be elected President or not, to argue the pros and cons of the authority of the incumbent President. It seems arrogant. It would be more appropriate for them to suggest an agenda they wish to discuss with the North rather than dragging the President’s feet. For the nation, it would be more reasonable for them to say what they would do similarly or differently from the current president.
The questions I would ask of you are, “What is your security policy?” “What is your opinion on the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and the Geumgang (Diamond Mountains) tourism project?” and “What do you think about the takeover of wartime operational control of Korean troops from the United States?”
Until now, these several principles have been comprehensively reflected in all of the security policies of my Administration.
I would like to say a few words about the ongoing Free Trade Agreement negotiations with the United States.
Opening a market is a global trend. We just can’t go against the current. The Luddite Movement during the Industrial Revolution was proven a long time ago to be against the historic current. Even during the Information Age, there was a movement opposing to the use of computers, but it has also been proven to be behind the times. It just doesn’t seem right to oppose market opening in the face of globalization.
We have to first change our social perception about market opening in order for the country’s progressive reformists to become Korea’s leading power in the political and social arenas. We must understand and accept the historic trend. Then we will be able to join the mainstream in the world. Initially. there were a number of critical and negative theories about the FTA deals, but they have been proven wrong.
The issue surrounding the opening of the country’s agricultural sector seems to be the hardest matter to tackle. But when we study the matter more closely, we can see that a third of agricultural items are not likely to be traded or that we have a comparative advantage for these items. Another third is not a cause for concern because they are competitive. The last third is the area we need to worry about, and that is rice. But the WTO Agreement protects trade issues surrounding rice, and they do not necessarily pertain to the FTA talks. Regardless, we have been working on strong measures to further protect the country’s rice market, and we will continue to make complementary efforts.
When Korea joined the World Trade Organization in 1994, the entire country was in turmoil. But what if we hadn’t jointed the WTO back then? What would have happened to the Korean market? Looking back, the people who opposed joining the WTO said that the market would crash if we joined the WTO. But they were wrong. Since then, many have said the same thing whenever Korea moved to join treaties to open its market, but they were never right.
Whether to seal free trade agreement deals or not is no longer an ideological issue. It is a matter of survival. When I watched a report on KTV regarding how NAFTA affected the Mexican economy and people, I noticed a considerable difference from the reports previously shown on MBC and KBS.
웹사이트: http://www.president.go.kr
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2008년 8월 6일 17:22
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